

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 29, 2013

MEMO TO: Steven Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: Thomas Spatz, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending November 29, 2013

Incorporation of Issue H Weapon Response: Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Pantex, LLC (B&W) submitted an authorization basis change package to NPO which incorporates the Justification for Continued Operations (JCO) for the Issue H weapon response and the JCO for *Forward and Aft Component Removal Issues* into the weapon specific Hazard Analysis Report (HAR) and numerous Safety Analysis Reports (SARs). This change package also provides resolution of path forwards identified in three different Evaluation of the Safety of the Situations (ESSs).

The original JCO for *Forward and Aft Component Removal Issues* was approved on May 4, 2012, and extended once in May 2013. (See report for 2/22/2013.) The existing JCO for component removal will expire on November 29, 2013. Because of its magnitude, NPO will not be able to complete their review of the authorization basis change package prior to the expiration of the JCO. Therefore, B&W has requested an extension of the JCO for component removal until NPO approves this new authorization basis change package. NPO sent a letter to B&W approving the JCO extension until 30-days after the approval of the authorization basis change package. The JCO for component removal is based on weapon response values from the original JCO, with confirmation from the Design Agency in March 2013 that the weapon responses have not changed.

High Pressure Fire Loop (HPFL) Check Valve Failure: During planned maintenance of the HPFL, B&W discovered that a check valve on the diesel pump side failed. B&W entered the appropriate Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) in order to perform the planned maintenance, and remained in the LCO after the valve failure was discovered. B&W is categorizing the event as a performance degradation of a Safety Class Structure System or Component that is required to be operable.

Hoist Failed Pre-Operation Check: This week, B&W paused operations in one facility when an ASME NUM-1 hoist chain bound up during the pre-operational checks performed by the Production Technicians. B&W considers the Facility Crane Assembly as a design feature in the Bays and Cells Safety Analysis Report. B&W established an in-service inspection of this design feature to test the hoist upper-limit devices for proper operation at low speed and under no load before first use of the hoist in a shift. This is implemented in the facility as a pre-shift operation. During the pre-shift operation, the chain of the hoist bound up and rendered the hoist inoperable. B&W paused operations, the Facility Representative was notified, and maintenance personnel were notified to free up the chain.